The Paradox of Abundance Anxiety about the adverse effects of technological change on employment has a venerable history. In the early nineteenth century, for example, a group of English textile artisans calling themselves the Luddites staged a machine-trashing rebellion. Their brashness earned them a place (rarely positive) in the lexicon. Economists have historically rejected what we call the "lump of labor" fallacy, the supposition that an increase in labor productivity inevitably reduces employment because there is only a finite amount of work to do. While intuitively appealing, this idea is demonstrably false. In 1900, for example, 41 percent of the United States workforce was in agriculture. By 2000, that share had fallen to 2 percent, after the Green Revolution revolutionized crop (p.238) yields. But the employment-to-population ratio rose over the twentieth century as women moved from home to market, and the unemployment rate fluctuated cyclically, with no long-term increase.
Despite sustained increases in material standards of living, fear of the adverse employment consequences of technological advancement recurred repeatedly in the twentieth century. In his widely discussed Depression-era essay "Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren," John Maynard Keynes (1930) foresaw that in a century's time, "we may be able to perform all the operations of agriculture, mining, and manufacture with a quarter of the human effort to which we have been accustomed." Keynes viewed these developments as posing short-term challenges, "For the moment the very rapidity of these changes is hurting us and bringing difficult problems to solve.…We are being afflicted with a new disease of which some readers may not yet have heard the name, but of which they will hear a great deal in the years to comenamely, technological unemployment." But Keynes was Progress" whose charge was "to identify and assess the past effects and the current and prospective role and pace of technological change; to identify and describe the impact of technological and economic change on production and employment, including new job requirements and the major types of worker displacement, both technologically and economic, which are likely to occur during the next 10 years."
While the commission ultimately concluded that automation did not threaten employment at that time, it recommended, as insurance against this possibility, "a guaranteed minimum income for each family; using the government as the employer of last resort for the hard core jobless; two years of free education in either community or vocational colleges; a fully administered federal employment service, and individual Federal Reserve Bank sponsorship in area economic development free from the Fed's national headquarters" (The
Herald Press 1966).
The blue-ribbon commission's sanguine conclusions did not entirely allay the concerns of contemporary social critics. In an open letter to President Johnson in 1966, the self-titled Ad Hoc Committee on the Triple Threat, which included Nobel laureates Linus Pauling (chemistry) and Gunnar Myrdal (economics), as well as economic historian Robert Heilbroner, opined that "The traditional link between jobs and incomes is being broken.…The economy of abundance can sustain all citizens in comfort and economic security whether or not they Interest in 1965, Heilbroner argued that, "the new technology is threatening a whole new group of skills-the sorting, filing, checking, calculating, remembering, comparing, okaying skills -that are the special preserve of the office worker.…In the end, as machines continue to invade society, duplicating greater and greater numbers of social tasks, it is human labor itself-at least, as we now think of 'labor'-that is gradually rendered redundant" (1965: 34-6 ).
In the five decades since the Ad Hoc Committee penned its open letter to the President, human labor has certainly not been rendered redundant, as these scholars had feared. But automation anxiety has clearly returned. Casual empiricism suggests that economists and public intellectuals have begun to question whether these earlier projections of technological unemployment were in fact flat-out wrong, as had been widely accepted, or whether instead they were simply ahead of their time in anticipating imminent employment challenges that in reality took several additional decades to materialize. For example, in a 2012 New York Times column titled "Rise of the Robots," Paul Krugman cites the falling share of payments to labor in US national income as a harbinger of things to come:
"If this is the wave of the future, it makes nonsense of just about all the conventional wisdom on reducing inequality.
Better education won't do much to reduce inequality if the big rewards simply go to those with the most assets." Krugman is not alone among economists in invoking this concern. The Economist (Jan. 18, 2014) suggest that something has profoundly changed in the macroeconomy that has reduced the "scarcity" value of labor.
A second pattern adding to the case for concern is the sharp falls in real wage levels of non-college workers in a number of advanced countries in recent decades, despite the decline in the relative supply of these workers. In the United States, this is seen particularly in the declining wages of non-college males evident in Figure 14 
The Puzzle of Falling Wages
There is no economic law that says that wages must always rise. Under normal competitive conditions, an increase in the supply of a given skill group will reduce its market wage. The falling wages of low-skill workers could, therefore, reflect nothing more interesting than a rise in their relative supply. Yet, in essentially all advanced economies-and certainly in A second candidate interpretation of these demographic and wage patterns is that there have been "skill-biased" demand shifts that have raised demand for high-relative (p.246) to lowskill labor. Indeed, a considerable body of evidence suggests that such shifts have occurred both in recent decades and throughout most of the twentieth century (see Katz and Autor 1999; Autor et al. 2008; Goldin and Katz 2008) . However, while a skill-biased demand shift will raise the relative wages of high-relative to low-skill workers (again assuming the elasticity of substitution exceeds one), such a shift would not be expected to reduce real wages of low-skill workers. In fact, the opposite should occur: both high-and low-skill workers should experience an increase in earnings, though high-skill workers should gain by more. 10 The fact that real wages of high-skill workers have risen while those of low-skill workers have fallen in the face of a falling relative supply of low-skill workers is therefore inconsistent with either a supply-induced rise in the skill premium or a canonical skill-complementary technological change.
What else might be going on? It is likely that the causes for the sharp falls in real earnings among non-college workers are multiple, and it would be incorrect to conclude that technological change is the exclusive or even, necessarily, the primary explanation. One central factor that may have contributed to declining wages of less-educated workers is the globalization of labor markets, seen particularly in the greatly increased US trade integration with developing countries. Globalization has become particularly important for US labor A second factor impinging on the earnings of non-college males is the decline in the penetration and bargaining power of labor unions in the United States. Unions have historically obtained relatively generous wage and benefit packages for blue-collar workers. Over the last three decades, however, US private-sector union density-i.e. the fraction of private-sector workers who belong to labor unions-has fallen by approximately 70 percent, from 24 percent in 1973 to 7 percent in 2011 (Card et al. 2004; Hirsch 2008) . While the precise contribution of declining unionization to the evolution of male wage levels and wage inequality is a subject of ongoing debate, a number of studies place this contribution at 20 to 30 percent. Notably, because union membership has been historically quite concentrated among blue-collar workers, the majority of whom are males, the decline in union membership may have differentially affected non-college male earnings.
A third possibility, one which is the focus of this chapter, is that the ongoing substitution of computer-intensive machinery for workers performing routine task-intensive jobs has depressed demand for workers in both blue-collar production and (p.247) white-collar office, clerical, and administrative support positions, and reduced the set of middle-skill career jobs available to non-college workers more generally (Autor et al. 2003; Autor and Dorn 2013) . I discuss this possibility in detail next.
It bears emphasis that these three forces-technological change, deunionization, and globalization-work in tandem. Advances in information and communications technologies have directly changed job demands in US workplaces while simultaneously facilitating the globalization of production by Economists frequently speak in abstract terms about capitalskill complementarity and capital-labor substitution-and with some justification, since these terms have precise meanings in the abstract production functions that the economics profession uses to represent economic processes. I find it useful, however, to conceptualize these terms concretely as reflecting distinctive technological phenomena with specific characteristics. Very roughly, one may characterize the recent phases of workplace computerization as undergoing three successive epochs: simulation, communications, and engagement. 11 The first is well understood, the second much less so, and the third reflects the current frontier. Its economic implications are a terra incognita.
Simulation
The notion of using computers to simulate (or replicate) codified, repetitive information-processing tasks stretches back to the dawn of the computer era. An early example was the use of punch card-driven computers at the Los Alamos distribution of residents in each census enumeration district, it is "simulating" a work process that would, in a previous era, have been done by humans.
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The implications of computer simulation for work organization are reasonably well captured by the ideas set forth in Autor et al. (2003, ALM hereafter) . ALM describe the process whereby computers substitute for workers in performing "routine" codifiable tasks. Routine tasks are characteristic of many middle-skilled cognitive and manual activities, such as bookkeeping, clerical work, and repetitive production tasks. Because the core job tasks of these occupations follow precise, well-understood procedures, they have in recent decades become increasingly codified in computer software and performed by machines. This has led to a substantial decline in employment in clerical, administrative support, and, to a lesser degree, production and operative employment.
But simulation as a computing paradigm has clear boundaries:
programmers cannot write a program to simulate a process that they (or the scientific community at large) do not explicitly understand. This constraint is more binding than one might initially surmise because there are many tasks that humans understand tacitly and accomplish effortlessly for which they do not know the explicit "rules" or procedures. In the words of philosopher Michael Polanyi (1966) , "We know more than we can tell." When we ride upright on a twowheeled bicycle, recognize different species of birds based only on a blurry glimpse from afar, write a compelling paragraph, or develop a hypothesis to explain a poorly understood phenomenon, we are engaging in tasks that we only tacitly understand how to perform.
As ALM discuss, the applicability of "simulation" to accomplishing human work tasks is particularly constraining in two broad areas, which they term "abstract" and "manual" tasks. These lie at opposite ends of the occupational skill distribution. Abstract tasks require problem-solving capabilities, intuition, and persuasion. They typically employ workers with high levels of education and analytical capability. The secularly falling price of accomplishing routine tasks using computer capital complements the "abstract" creative, problem-solving, and coordination tasks performed by highly educated workers such as professionals and managers, for whom data analysis is an input into production.
In contrast, manual tasks require situational adaptability, visual and language recognition, and in-person interactions.
These tasks are characteristic of the jobs performed by janitors and cleaners, home health aides, construction laborers, security (p.249) personnel, and motor vehicle operators. They demand workers who are physically adept and, in some cases, able to communicate fluently in spoken language. They appear to require little in the way of formal education, however, at least relative to a labor market where most workers have completed high school.
This latter observation (low education and training requirements) applies with particular force to service occupations. Tasks such as food preparation and serving, cleaning and janitorial work, grounds cleaning and maintenance, in-person health assistance by home health aides, and numerous jobs in security and protective services, are highly intensive in non-routine manual tasks. These are not highly skilled activities by human labor standards, but they present daunting challenges for automation. Equally noteworthy is that many of the outputs of these jobs (haircuts, fresh meals, housecleaning) must be produced and performed on-site or in person (at least for now), and hence these tasks are not currently subject to outsourcing. Yet, because these jobs generally do not require formal education or extensive training beyond a high school degree, the potential supply of workers who can perform these jobs is very large-which is likely to mute the potential for rapid wage growth in these occupations even in the face of rising demand.
14 Since jobs that are intensive in either abstract or manual tasks are generally found at opposite ends of the occupational skill spectrum-in professional, managerial, and technical occupations on the one hand, and in service and laborer occupations on the other-it is natural to suspect that computer "simulation" of routine job tasks has contributed to a "polarization" of employment opportunities. A large body of US and international evidence confirms this intuition: by The implications of this process for employment and earnings are multivalent. For highly educated workers, computerization has almost certainly complemented their skills-raising their productivity and the scale of operations they can command, with attendant increases in relative and real earnings (Autor et al. 1998 ). For less-educated workers, the implications are ambiguous at best. On the one hand, the displacement of workers from middle-skill clerical, administrative support, production, and operative positions likely leads to downward occupational mobility toward less highly trained service positions. This undoubtedly places downward pressure on wages in these occupations. At the same time, it is possible for the real "value" of the output of (p.250) services to rise as societal wealth increases and the scarcity value of machineproduced output falls (e.g. think of large-screen TVs). Thus, while it is possible but far from certain for workers at all levels to benefit, the weight of the evidence suggests this has not for the most part occurred, particularly in the last decade. 15 My unproven hunch is that the net effect of the wave of computer "simulation" of workplace tasks has been to depress the earnings, and ultimately the employment, of less-educated workers.
Communications
Starting in the early 1980s, the advancing capabilities of computers in simulation were complemented by advances in telecommunications. Although large organizations such as airlines, banks, and (of course) the military had been harnessing telecommunications to connect computers for decades, price declines and technological advances in the 1980s and 1990s made computer communications ubiquitous and powerful. to share data and resources (e.g. file servers and printers). Before long, local area networks were interconnected in "wide area networks" within organizations, allowing the personal, mini, and mainframe computers belonging to a single organization to communicate across disparate locations over dedicated backbones. The opening of the internet to civilian and commercial use in 1995 provided firms with a set of protocols and non-dedicated infrastructure that ultimately enabled any digital device to communicate with any other internet-connected digital device anywhere in the world. Even more recently, the deployment of high-speed mobile networks has enabled digital devices to remain continuously connected to the internet over a large portion of the world's populated land areas (and at sea or in the air via satellites).
How do these enhanced capabilities-ubiquity, high-speed communications, and a limitless set of "online" resourcesexpand or reshape the simulation paradigm? I do not pretend to have the complete answer to this question, but I see at least two profound consequences. 16 One is that the marriage of computing and communications makes it far easier for computers to take on a coordination or oversight role than was conceivable in the "simulation era"-for example, dispatching trucks, routing packages, orchestrating the flow of parts on an auto assembly line, or dynamically managing (p.251) the layout, restocking, and order retrieval from a warehouse.
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These examples are all, arguably, simulation tasks in that computers are "simply" calculating, optimizing, and controlling following a procedure set down by a programmer. However, unlike the examples of payroll processing or census enumeration, computers in these applications are interacting in real time with the environment. Sensing and communications technologies give computers the ability to monitor a disparate set of activities in continuous time and issue instructions to coordinate and adapt these activities as new data arrive or conditions change.
One prominent application that builds on these capabilities is online sales. Prior to the communications era of computing, the primary functions of computers in retail sales were to track inventory and assist cashiers in customer checkout. expanded the range of sales-related activities subject to computerization. Contemporary business-to-consumer websites showcase products in virtual electronic malls, recommend alternative or complementary purchases based on the search behavior of the current and past users, verify the buyer's identity, conduct the financial transaction, move the order into the back-end fulfillment system, and notify the purchaser, seller, and shipper of the transaction's status as it unfolds.
One can object that these activities are simply glorified "simulation": online sales systems are, in effect, carrying out the codified steps of tracking inventory, displaying products, transacting purchases, and tracking fulfillment. 18 But this interpretation strikes me as reductive. Fifteen years ago, one might have persuasively argued that computers could not effectively substitute for salespersons because they are unable to showcase products, make product recommendations, offer expertise and advice on product suitability and features, and more generally cannot "get to know" the customer. Those predictions would have been technically correct but substantively wrong. While it remains the case that online storefronts cannot measure your shoe size or help you to lace up a pair of oxfords, the virtues of convenience, broad selection, abundant information, and informative product recommendations (based on the behavior of countless prior buyers) appear in many cases to trump the virtues of in-person sales. Notably, the genesis of these advances is not simply that "simulation" has improved. The key enabler is communications: online storefronts serve the customer from any location and at any time, and provide remarkably rich decision-relevant information (photographs, product specifications, user reviews, how-to videos), in many cases exceeding what an expert salesperson could offer.
(p.252) Computer communications-and the internet in particular-also enable a set of information-based services that arguably had no close counterpart in the precommunications area: search engines. Search engines draw on systems of network computers to provide services at zero marginal cost that, until recently, were both time-and resource-intensive to obtain: rapid, accurate search and what a skilled research librarian would do if she had access to many of the world's best libraries, and also had time to read and memorize their full contents for instant recollection. But the absurdity of the comparison highlights a critical set of differences. The methods that search engines use to "search" for information are so different from how humans search for information (absent computers) that it is inaccurate to characterize computers as "simulating" human search.
Humans do not read, memorize, and sort limitless amounts of information for later retrieval. Instead, they catalog where information is likely to be found (using the Dewey decimal system, travel guides, encyclopedias, journal indexes) and make directed, purposive searches within those locations to identify specific pieces of information. Humans have limited information absorption and recall capability, but they can use context and logic to quickly narrow the scope of a search to the logical locations where the information is likely to reside (e.g. to look up the historical population of Manhattan, I would consult old census volumes).
One focal contrast between human and machine search helps to highlight these differences. Human search techniques require prior organization and cataloging of information; attempting to search for a specific fact in a library where all of the books had been randomly distributed across shelves would be fruitless. Such a library would, however, pose no problem for a search engine; in fact, The power of online search also highlights the complementarity between successive waves of information technologies-specifically, simulation and communications.
Search engines depend fundamentally on computer communications not only for (p.253) information delivery but also for primary data gathering. Google does not, to a first approximation, create the information it serves; it simply aggregates the countless information sources that others have made available through their computer systems. Thus, it is the very existence of computer networks that generates the resources that search engines search over. Search engines, and their close relatives, are meta-technologies that have virtuously-and arguably unexpectedly-emerged from the collective interaction of a vast number of computer systems, many of which are engaged in standard "simulation" tasks.
The power of this "meta" technology is increasingly evident beyond search. Automated "discovery" software reads reams of legal documents disgorged by companies undergoing lawsuits, identifies themes, catalogs contents, and attempts to thread together conversations based on email and paper chains (Markoff 2011) . Fraud detection software applies statistical tools to flag suspicious patterns of transactions in real time, and often calls credit card holders to alert them of possible frauds. Recommendation engines suggest music and movies to consumers based on their expressed and revealed tastes, which are aggregated and compared with the browsing and rating tastes of countless other users.
While it would be foolhardy to attempt to infer general labor market implications from these high level observations, it is inarguable that the era of computer communications has substantially expanded the set of tasks beyond that which could be accomplished by computer "simulation." On the one hand, the information presentation and interaction seen in online sales allow computers to accomplish many interactive "manual" tasks that are not directly amenable to simulation in the canonical sense, such as order-taking and sales (i.e. the computer does not closely replicate what a human agent would do). On the other hand, the growing sophistication of statistical pattern recognition algorithms enables computers to encroach upon "expert" domains-work that has historically been the province of research librarians, paralegals, travel agents, and teachers.
Engagement
Computerization has recently entered a third era, "machine engagement," in which computers are emerging from their largely passive role as ever-ready information appliances to become increasingly "alert" machines-aware of people and objects, sensitive to contexts, and able to adjust plans accordingly to accomplish useful tasks. 19 One does not have to look hard to find early examples of "engaged" machines:
• Smartphones interpret and respond to voice commands based upon both verbal and contextual clues-where the user is currently located (e.g. • Robotic vacuums (e.g. Neato Botvac) use lasers to scan and map rooms while vacuuming, thus plotting a purposive course over the autonomously mapped cleaning area rather than using the traditional "bump and turn" principle used by earlier generations of self-propelled devices.
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• Self-driving cars (e.g. the Google Car) semiautonomously pilot conventional vehicles (retrofitted with sensors and actuators) along moderately complex suburban and urban roadsapplying the accelerator, operating the steering wheel, complying with road signs and speed limits, and braking for unexpected hazards. Because robotic vehicles are never distracted, drowsy, or temperamental, it is a certainty that they will ultimately prove safer drivers than human operators.
These recent advances sit atop prior waves of computer simulation and telecommunications (as well as dramatic hardware price declines). Laser sensing and object recognition tools harness "simulation" software for digitizing physical environments. Location and contextual awareness technologies exploit mobile data connections to access digitized maps and search engines.
Distinct from earlier waves of computerization, recent advances in machine "engagement" with humans do not rely upon conventional computer simulation. Because these engagement tasks remain, to a substantial extent, unsolved problems in science and engineering, contemporary artificial intelligence has devised an "end run" around the problem.
Rather than explicitly codifying such tasks, statistical machine learning algorithms inductively learn these tasks through a process of exposure, training, and reinforcement. This process enables computers to (in some cases) accomplish non-codified problems that, while remarkably mundane for humans, remain daunting challenges for engineering.
As one concrete example of machine learning, consider the challenge of object recognition, specifically the task of visually identifying a chair. But this is not the case for most object recognition programs. Why not?
(p.255) Applying the "simulation" paradigm, a programmer might attempt to specify ex ante what features of an object suggest that it is a chair-it possesses legs, arms, a seat, and a back, for example. One could then program machines to identify objects possessing these features as chairs. But having specified such a feature set, one would immediately discover that many chairs that do not possess all features (e.g. no back, no legs). If one then relaxed the required feature set accordingly (e.g. chair back optional), the included set would clearly encompass many objects that are not chairs (e.g. tables). Thus, the simple "simulation" approach to object recognition-and many more sophisticated variants-would likely have very high misclassification rates.
Why is this ex ante approach unlikely to work? Ultimately, what makes an object a chair is that it is a device purposebuilt to facilitate human beings in the act of sitting. Because there are an endless number of ways to accomplish this objective, it is likely almost impossible to pre-specify what attributes an object must possess to be a chair. Accordingly, humans (likely) recognize chairs not (simply) by comparing candidate objects to pre-specified feature sets but, instead, by reasoning about both the attributes of the object and the attributes of the human body to assess whether the candidate object is likely intended to serve as a chair (Grabner et al. 2011) . For example, both a toilet and a traffic cone look somewhat like a chair, but a bit of reasoning about their shapes vis-à-vis the human anatomy suggests that a traffic cone is unlikely to make for a good seat. This implies that the problem of object recognition-at least as practiced by the human brain-is far deeper than the problem of determining whether objects have specific attributes; it likely requires reasoning about what an object is "for" and whether it is likely to serve that purpose. One is reminded of Carl Sagan's remark that, "If you wish to make an apple pie from scratch, you must first invent the universe."
Contemporary object recognition programs do not, for the most part, take this reasoning-based approach to identifying Not surprisingly, the long-term potential of machine learning to circumvent the reasoning problem is a subject of active debate among computer scientists. Some researchers expect that as computing power rises and training databases grow, the brute force machine learning approach will ultimately approach or exceed human capabilities. Others suspect that the machine learning approach will only ever get it right "on average" while missing many of the most important and informative exceptions. In either case, there is little disagreement that, at present, the ability of machines to "engage" in the human world is substantially constrained by (at least) three attributes of the candidate task: 1. Structure in the environment. Machine adaptability to variation in environment is, at present, far less complete, less accurate, and less reliable than human adaptability. It is natural, therefore, that the first (and current) primary application of commercial robotics is on production lines, where the environment is radically simplified and there are few variations in task requirements with which machines must contend (often only a handful of distinct operations). In production settings, industrial robots are typically bolted to the floor and surrounded by large cages that serve to protect nearby humans from their potent combination of superhuman speed and near-complete blindness to their environments.
Degrees of freedom in dexterous interactions.
Though robots probably will eventually be able to walk up and down stairs, load and unload dishwashers, and fold towels, robotic dexterity will be far short of human dexterity for many years to come. It is unlikely that robots will cook fresh meals, sand and paint houses, cut hair, or wrap birthday presents anytime soon.
Richness of perceptual information required to support
completion of tasks. Many mundane daily tasks are deeply dependent upon rich perceptual information. To remove, dust, and replace the objects on a shelf, untie a pair of shoes, or pack a set of items in a suitcase, an agent must recognize nonuniform objects, understand and respect their physical properties (e.g. clothes can be folded in a suitcase but shoes cannot), and make fine visual discriminations (e.g. are the shoelaces single or double-knotted?). These perceptual demands are trivial for human actors but are far outside the realm of machine capability at present.
Of course, a fourth constraint on all of these tasks is cost. While it might be technically feasible to build a robotic dishwasher loader/unloader in the near future, it will not be commercially viable to do so until the cost of numerous digital and mechanical components falls considerably.
What do these observations imply about the trajectory of capital-labor substitution? Again, it would be foolhardy to confidently project general equilibrium economic implications store stockers and warehouse workers, and fewer salespersons-even in "brick and mortar" shops. At the same time, there will remain core manual task-intensive jobs that are not subject to machine substitution anytime soon: child care, elder care, and health care; food preparation; construction and skilled repair; and numerous dexterous jobs that require high levels of adaptability, precision, and contextual awareness.
While the implications for the aggregate labor demand are ambiguous-since these technological advancements both substitute for and complement labor-their implications for skill demands appear more readily discerniable. Advances in machine engagement appear poised to have a far greater labor-substituting impact in low education, manual tasks than in high education, abstract tasks. These advances will likely amplify the paradox of abundance: by making low education labor that much less scarce, they will augment inequality even as they generate riches.
Conclusions
Generations of scholars and pundits have worried about the adverse labor market consequences of technological change. Generations of neoclassical economists have assured these thinkers that their worries are misplaced. Though I consider myself a neoclassical economist, I believe that economists' bland reassurances are becoming less and less convincing. Technological advances have not created the mass unemployment that many feared. But my reading of the evidence is that they have significantly depressed wages among a substantial subset of workers, catalyzing sharp falls in labor force participation. Though declining participation in response to falling wages may be "voluntary," it is definitely not welfare-improving relative to a setting where non-college workers might be drawn back into the labor force by higher wages. While it is dangerous to extrapolate far into the future based on current trends, I foresee the challenge facing noncollege workers becoming more severe as "engaged" machinery increasingly subsumes manual tasks.
There will of course be encroachments upward as well: core job tasks of salespersons, educators, attorneys, engineers, and computer programmers will be increasingly subject to automation. I worry less about these worker groups, both because I think the rate of encroachment will be slower, and because these groups have greater resources and skills to adapt accordingly. But the changes will nevertheless be significant.
Some writers would at this point draw an analogy between the economic eclipse of horses by motorized vehicles in the first decades of the twentieth century and the coming obsolescence of human labor. But there is an important difference between these examples: horses do not own capital and people do.
Horses were not made wealthier by the availability of machine substitutes for their labor, but people will be (p.258) (collectively) enriched. Thus, the paradox of abundance is not one of impoverishment but one of maldistribution. If technological advances make human labor substantially less scarce-as many have feared, and as Keynes eagerly anticipated-the challenge will not be finding jobs for people to do, but rather finding a means to distribute our abundant societal riches absent labor scarcity as a primary means of income distribution. forward. Their correlational evidence suggests, however, that outsourcing of labor-intensive tasks rather than capital-labor substitution is the largest proximate contributor to declining labor shares at the level of industries.
( 7 ) Gregg et al. (2013) report that a similar decline in low earnings has not occurred in the UK.
( 8 ) As reported in Autor and Wasserman (2013) , over the entire 1979-2008 period, a 10% fall in wages for a demographic group is robustly associated with a 5.7 percentage point decline in its employment-to-population rate. The positive correlation between rising (or falling) wages and rising (or falling) employment rates holds in each of the last three decades (1979-89, 1989-99, and 2000-10) , as well as before and during the Great Recession (2000-7 and 2007-10) . The robust positive relationship between wage and employment changes is detected for all demographic subgroups: both sexes, all race groups, both younger and older workers, and both college and non-college workers. ( 13 ) In many cases, the workers who performed these tasks were given the job title of "computer" (Grier 2005 Rossi-Hansberg (2004, 2006) explore how these two distinct eras of computerizationsimulation and communications-may have distinct effects on the organization of knowledge hierarchies within firms. 
